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possibility of structural relief. And, even when
they asked for it, they called it only a “reorgan-
ization.” Tellingly, one of Microsoft’s first sug-
gested changes to the government’s proposal
was that it be renamed a “divestiture.”
Why are we afraid even to discuss in a
straightforward manner whether we should
break up Microsoft? This is probably because 
of the legal fiction that a corporation is a “per-
son.” 
This notion is deeply ingrained in the legal
profession, the business community, and soci-
ety at large. Courts have long held that corpo-
rations are legal “people” who are entitled to
“due process”—in other words, corporations
have constitutional rights. Corporations have
names (even nicknames—who would want to
execute “Ma Bell”?), pay taxes, and are subject
to most laws—just like real people. Moreover, a
corporation is a very special type of person. In
theory a corporation is a person who cannot
die; a corporation is an immortal. 
The court of appeals might well have rea-
soned this way, at least subconsciously. In dis-
cussing the conditions under which divestiture
might be appropriate, it held: “If indeed
Microsoft is a unitary company, division might
very well require Microsoft to reproduce each of
these departments in each new entity . . .”2 The
reference to the company as a possible unitary
entity rather than as a convenient grouping of
contracts, and the reference to the need for
reproduction following a divestiture, could well
reflect more than a logical assessment of under-
lying economics.
In reality, of course, a corporation is not a
conscious organic entity. It is just a series of
contracts between real people. It is nothing
more than formal and informal relationships
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On June 28, 2001, the D.C. Court of Appeals
held that Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws
repeatedly, relentlessly, and over a multi-year
period. The court ruled eight separate times
that Microsoft engaged in conduct that illegally
maintained its monopoly in PC operating sys-
tems. Despite these strongly worded conclu-
sions concerning Microsoft’s liability, the court
was extremely cautious when it considered
whether to break up the company. It held that
divestiture was a “radical” remedy that should
be imposed with “great caution.”1
Why this reluctance to order structural relief?
Even people who condemn Microsoft’s conduct
and admit that it probably will continue to
engage in predatory practices shudder at the
idea that we should break it up: “Conduct relief
of virtually any type, sure. Even a multi-billion
dollar fine could be appropriate. But don’t even
think about structural relief. Don’t destroy
Microsoft. Only a fool would execute a compa-
ny that has made so many wonderful products.”
The government did not even dare to men-
tion the term “structural relief” when it filed its
suit. It merely asked for “such additional per-
manent relief as is necessary . . . .” Why the
omission? Perhaps shrewd government lawyers
knew that if they started the proceeding by
explicitly admitting that the best way to achieve
justice was by doing the unthinkable they would
be more likely to lose the case completely. The
judge might reason that if the only effective rem-
edy for a violation was the corporate “death
penalty,” he would instead just let Microsoft off
completely. Only after they spent years proving
that Microsoft had repeatedly engaged in anti-
competitive conduct did the enforcers raise the
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value. No responsible member of our society
would execute a flesh-and-blood person without
certainty “beyond a reasonable doubt” that they
had engaged in a horrible crime like murder
(and many do not believe in capital punishment
even under these circumstances). It is likely that
many or most of us subconsciously apply these
requirements to the Microsoft case: we believe
that it is only appropriate to break up Microsoft
if we are virtually certain that it committed a
crime as horrible as murder. And, of course,
even though Microsoft was convicted of eight
separate antitrust violations, it did not murder
any real people and its crimes are not as clear-
cut as murder. Therefore, we reason, they do not
deserve to be executed.
We have to remind ourselves that United
States v. Microsoft is just a civil trial where the
government is, rightly, required to prove its
case only under a “more likely than not” stan-
dard. The antitrust laws forbid certain types of
economic activity, and were in large part
designed to give companies an incentive to
behave in the manner that is best for consumer
welfare. The remedy for an antitrust violation is
supposed to determine which arrangement of
contracts and contractual rights is best for soci-
ety. Microsoft has, of course, committed an anti-
trust violation. If it is “more likely than not” that
the best way to achieve the goals of the reme-
dy is through divestiture, the court should order
divestiture. If conduct remedies are more like-
ly to be optimal, the court should proceed in
that direction. These are simply economic alter-
natives that should be weighed against one
another rationally.
Moreover, the facts in the Microsoft case sug-
gest that the corporation would be relatively sim-
ple to break up. Microsoft essentially consists of
teams of immensely talented programmers and
a substantial body of intellectual property rights.
All a court would have to do would be to rule that
certain of these people and some of this intel-
lectual property now should be housed in par-
ticular buildings and be part of company A,
between shareholders, employees, and other
flesh-and-blood people, made for a variety of
economic purposes. Some are long term.
Others, however, are short-term or can be bro-
ken by one party at will. These contracts, more-
over, are changing continuously. 
Although a corporation can be immortal, in
fact corporations die every day. Corporations
also frequently sell divisions to other compa-
nies, spin off divisions to form separate new
firms, and divest portions of themselves in the
aftermath of mergers. The very concept of a
firm as an entity that shapes itself by decisions
about doing things internally through a hierarchy
or in the marketplace reflects the changeability
that is at the heart of corporate existence. The
shape of corporations is constantly in flux.
Antitrust is just another cause of this flux. A
court-ordered divestiture would constitute only
a rearrangement of some of Microsoft’s con-
tracts, but not the company’s literal “execution.” 
Because a corporation is just a convenient
grouping of contracts, it follows that it should not
have the moral rights of a real person. Its share-
holders and employees have rights, of course,
but these will not necessarily be destroyed just
because the corporation is divided into two or
more parts. Shareholder value and jobs should
not be needlessly reduced, but reasonable peo-
ple differ as to whether the combined stock
value and employment levels of hypothetical
post-break up “baby Bills” would be more, or
less, than the current total values. Regardless,
Microsoft did break the law repeatedly, and it
did accrue illegally gotten gains, so we should
not be overly upset if its stock value decreases
somewhat as a result of the remedy proceeding.
Moreover, shareholder value could decrease
even more as a result of a tough, protracted
conduct-based remedy. Regardless, a possi-
ble decrease in shareholder value should not
deter us from rationally discussing whether
Microsoft should be broken up. 
The divestiture issue is far more fundamental
and emotion-laden than that of shareholder
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through a series of conduct remedies. 
However, many believe that Microsoft has
had a history of “interpreting” past court orders
in a manner that made them ineffective. Many
simply do not trust Microsoft to live up to either
the letter or the spirit of the Stipulation. Many
fully expect Microsoft to delay and circumvent
this remedy. 
The parties’ agreement provides that if
Microsoft violates the agreement, “the plaintiffs
may apply to the Court for a one-time extension
of this Final Judgment of up to two years,
together with such other relief as the Court may
deem appropriate .”7 Assuming that Microsoft
does violate this Stipulation, the enforcers and
the court should reevaluate whether to impose
a structural remedy. They should do so using
logic instead of emotion. They should decide
upon the most appropriate relief considering
each option on its legal, economic, and admin-
istrative merits, without anthropomorphizing. In
light of Microsoft’s evasions they will have to
reconsider the best way to make sure that this
lawbreaker is deprived of the fruits of its illegal
conduct, that competition is restored to the
affected market, and that Microsoft is prevented
from engaging in similar conduct. The best way
to do all of this is the most straightforward one.
The court should break up Microsoft.v
1 United States v. Microsoft, No. 00-5212, at 61 (D.C. Cir. June 28,
2001).
2 Id. at 105.
3 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
4 See Conduct Remedies in the Microsoft Monopolization Litigation,
Paper Presented at AAI Press Briefing at the National Press Club
(Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org. The
American Antitrust Institute presented a white paper which called
for ten tough conduct remedies to be imposed in the Microsoft
case. 
5 Id.
6 See Revised Proposed Final Judgment (Nov. 6, 2001).
7 Id. at V(B) (emphasis added).
while others should be part of company B. This
situation is very much unlike that of United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.3 In that
celebrated case the court had to break up a
monopoly that made all of its shoe machines in
one factory. Compared to that situation, in
Microsoft a structural solution is simple. 
Further, meaningful conduct relief would be
likely to result in court oversight of many of
Microsoft’s activities for years to come. It cer-
tainly is possible to craft a tough package of
effective conduct remedies that will not hamper
the company’s ability to innovate.4 Yet, this
package is necessarily complex, lengthy, 
regulatory in nature, and susceptible to being
evaded.5 Even the settlement agreed to by 
the Department of Justice, nine states, and
Microsoft on November 6, 2001—which only
amounts to a slap on the wrist for Microsoft—will
last for five years, with possibly a two-year
extension.6 By contrast, structural relief would in
most ways be simpler, quicker, and less bur-
densome. It also is likely to be more effective
and much more difficult to evade. 
Reasonable people certainly can differ as to
whether the best, most pro-consumer, most pro-
innovation results in the Microsoft case are like-
ly to arise from a conduct-based remedy, from
dividing it into several corporations, or through
a combination of methods. Divestiture, howev-
er, should not only be a last resort. It should be
a viable option that is considered logically on its
legal, administrative and economic merits, with-
out the influence of subconscious anthropo-
morphizing. It certainly should not be thought of
in moral terms and avoided at all costs lest we
engage in the reprehensible act of “killing”
someone. It is in no respect the corporate equiv-
alent of the death penalty.
On Sept. 6, 2001, the federal and state
enforcers pursuing the case announced they
would not ask the court to break up Microsoft.
On November 6, the Department of Justice, nine
states, and Microsoft agreed to a Revised
Proposed Final Judgment that settled the case
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